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Agentic attack frameworks

Behaviour first. The addresses have already moved.

What to look for after the FBI’s advisory on ARTEX and the campaigns using it. The behaviours survive the infrastructure rotating and the addresses do not, so they come first here and the atoms come last — which is the order these documents usually recommend and never follow.

Network indicators are historical observations, not current infrastructure. Each row is dated: either the date its source said it was live, or — where no source gave one — the date it was reported. Cloud and proxy addresses get reassigned, so a hit is a reason to look, not a verdict.

Before you act on any of this

Four things, in this order

  1. Look back to at least 1 October 2026. Sign-in logs — interactive, non-interactive and service-principal — directory API activity, cloud audit, web and WAF, DNS and proxy. Confirm the retention actually goes back that far before you conclude you found nothing.
  2. Vet before you block. Many of these are proxies, virtual private network exits or cloud hosts that get reassigned. The FBI’s own guidance on this list is to investigate before acting on it, and it draws no distinction between indicators — the same instruction covers every one it publishes. The Usecolumn below is our judgement about where each row is worth starting. Vet all of them.
  3. Treat clients and model endpoints as context, not evidence. A common HTTP client or a model API domain means nothing on its own. It means something beside one of the behaviours below.
  4. On a hit, preserve before you change anything. Export sign-in, audit and API records first. Disable rather than delete — deleting the application destroys the evidence of what it did. Then contain, rotate, and report to ic3.gov.

Sources: FBI, 13 November 2026; Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 21 October 2026

The shape of a run

What the detections are detecting

Five moves, each feeding the next — which is why a leaked key, a source map and a weak sign-up flow get chained inside an afternoon rather than filed as three findings.

01

Map

Enumerates the estate and tests what each credential it finds can actually reach — sub-second permission checks, test writes, deployment dry-runs — before committing to anything.

T1595, Active ScanningT1580, Cloud Infrastructure DiscoveryT1087.004, Account Discovery: Cloud AccountT1526, Cloud Service Discovery
02

Enter

Takes whichever way in is cheapest: an unauthenticated API, an unsigned assertion, a credential in a front-end bundle, a partner's trust relationship.

T1190, Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationT1078, Valid AccountsT1195, Supply Chain CompromiseT1199, Trusted RelationshipT1606.002, Forge Web Credentials: SAML TokensT1552.001, Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in Files
03

Hold

Adds credentials to applications that already exist rather than creating new ones, because an app you already approved does not look like an intrusion.

T1505.003, Server Software Component: Web ShellT1078.004, Valid Accounts: Cloud AccountsT1098.001, Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud CredentialsT1105, Ingress Tool Transfer
04

Escalate

Harvests tickets, dumps credential stores, forges tokens against keys nobody rotated, and assigns itself the roles it is missing.

T1134, Access Token ManipulationT1098.003, Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud RolesT1552.005, Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata APIT1558.003, Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting
05

Take

Reads mail and object storage in bulk, stages it locally, and sends command output to rotating external endpoints.

T1114.002, Email Collection: Remote Email CollectionT1530, Data from Cloud StorageT1074.001, Data Staged: Local Data StagingT1071.001, Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

Source: FBI, 13 November 2026

Detections

What to build, and what it will cost you

Each one carries the telemetry it needs, a threshold to start from, and — the part these packs normally leave out — what else in a healthy estate does exactly the same thing. Tune against your own baseline before you turn any of them on.

Machine-speed bursts

T1595, Active ScanningT1110, Brute Force

Compressed bursts of requests with small iterative variations, many failures followed by a success. Sub-agents duplicating or overwriting each other's requests is a tell the volume is not a human and not a stable script.

TelemetryWeb and WAF logs, API gateway, sign-in logs

Start at

Microsoft reported peaks above 2,900 sign-in attempts per minute, more than 200 sign-ins in under four minutes on four application credentials, and 48 accounts with over 1,000 failures each. Mandiant timed execution bursts at 2-25 seconds, one carrying 27 events in 23 seconds, and over 500 requests fuzzing filenames in a single sweep. Start an order of magnitude below your own peak legitimate rate.

What else fires this

Load tests, a retry storm after an outage, a mobile client with a broken token-refresh loop, and the first morning of a bulk migration. Baseline per application, not per tenant.

Sources: FBI, 13 November 2026; Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 21 October 2026; Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant, 30 October 2026

Sub-second capability testing

T1580, Cloud Infrastructure DiscoveryT1526, Cloud Service Discovery

A credential being measured rather than used: permission checks in sub-second succession, test object writes immediately deleted, deployment validation dry-runs across many resource types, and dry-run flags on cloud API calls.

TelemetryCloud activity and audit logs, object-storage data plane

Start at

Measured in one reported run: a deployment-validation sweep across 11 resource types in 8 seconds, and test objects written and deleted 330-400ms apart. Start at any identity making validation-only calls across three or more resource types in a minute with no subsequent create; the sub-second write-then-delete is the higher-fidelity half.

What else fires this

Infrastructure-as-code plan runs, policy-compliance scanners, backup verification jobs and cost tooling all do this legitimately — which is why the rule needs an allowlist of your own automation identities before it is turned on, not after.

Sources: FBI, 13 November 2026; Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant, 30 October 2026

Bulk secret reads

T1555, Credentials from Password StoresT1552.005, Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API

One identity reading many secrets across several vaults in a short window — the step between finding a credential and using everything it unlocks.

TelemetryKey vault / secrets manager audit logs

Start at

Microsoft's published hunting logic: 20 or more successful secret reads across 3 or more vaults by a single identity within a 15-minute window. We have left their numbers rather than inventing our own.

What else fires this

Deployment pipelines at release time, secret-rotation jobs, and a newly onboarded cluster pulling its whole configuration. All three are predictable, so exclude them by identity and by schedule rather than by raising the threshold.

Sources: Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 21 October 2026; Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 5 November 2026 (cited, not read)

Credential probing

T1078.004, Valid Accounts: Cloud AccountsT1110, Brute Force

A failed client secret immediately followed by a success, or one source address authenticating as three or more different service principals.

TelemetryService-principal sign-in logs

Start at

Three or more distinct service principals from one address in an hour with at least one success. On Entra, invalid-secret errors AADSTS7000215 and AADSTS7000222 followed by a success is the sharper variant.

What else fires this

A shared egress address — a corporate gateway, a CI runner pool or a hosted integration platform — will legitimately present many service principals from one address. This detection is much better scoped to addresses outside your known automation ranges.

Sources: Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 5 November 2026 (cited, not read); Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 21 October 2026

Application persistence

T1098.001, Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud CredentialsT1098.003, Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles

A credential added to an application that already exists, a new owner, a new app-role assignment, or an application assigning itself a privileged role. This is the step that survives the original compromise being cleaned up.

TelemetryDirectory audit logs

Start at

Microsoft's logic flags an application adding itself to a high-privilege role with no prior self-assignment to that role in the preceding seven days. Credential additions to admin-consented applications deserve an alert at any volume.

What else fires this

Certificate rollover, a genuine ownership handover when someone leaves, and application registration automation. The first two are rare enough to review by hand; the third needs an allowlist.

Sources: Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 21 October 2026; FBI, 13 November 2026

Sequential enumeration

T1087, Account Discovery

Incrementing identifiers, or a single session touching an unusually high number of records, against portals and lookup APIs.

TelemetryApplication and API logs

Start at

Per-session record counts above the 99th percentile for that endpoint, or any session where more than half the requested identifiers are sequential.

What else fires this

Reporting exports, a customer's own integration paging through their data, and support staff working a queue. Scope by account age and by whether the records belong to the caller — an account three minutes old enumerating is a different event from an account three years old doing it.

Sources: FBI, 13 November 2026; Zscaler ThreatLabz, 14 October 2026 (via FBI FLASH note 7; link reaches their index); Akamai, 23 October 2026 (via FBI FLASH note 1; link reaches their index)

New account, instant cross-tenant reach

T1199, Trusted Relationship

An account created and confirmed, then within minutes requesting objects belonging to another tenant or another user.

TelemetryApplication and API logs

Start at

Any cross-tenant object request from an account less than an hour old. This one should be close to zero in a healthy system, which is what makes it worth alerting on rather than dashboarding.

What else fires this

Shared-workspace invitations and genuine multi-tenant customers, if your model allows one identity across tenants. If it does, scope to requests that are refused.

Sources: FBI, 13 November 2026; Akamai, 23 October 2026 (via FBI FLASH note 1; link reaches their index)

Server egress somewhere new

T1071.001, Application Layer Protocol: Web ProtocolsT1572, Protocol Tunneling

A production server reaching request-capture services, tunnelling providers, file-sharing or external model APIs it has never used before. Command output being posted to rotating external endpoints is the reported pattern.

TelemetryProxy, DNS and firewall logs

Start at

First-seen external destination for a given server, measured against a 30-day baseline. Model API endpoints reported in this activity include api.anthropic.com, api.deepseek.com, open.bigmodel.cn and api.x.ai — a production database server calling any of them is worth a look.

What else fires this

A legitimate new integration, a package manager reaching a new mirror, and any team that has genuinely started building with a model API. The point of this one is not that the destination is bad; it is that the source has no business going there.

Sources: FBI, 13 November 2026; Zscaler ThreatLabz, 14 October 2026 (via FBI FLASH note 7; link reaches their index)

Exposed workload turning inward

T1550.003, Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the TicketT1021.006, Remote Services: Windows Remote ManagementT1558.003, Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting

An internet-facing host initiating directory, authentication, file-sharing or remote-management protocols into the internal network. Kerberoasting and directory replication requests belong here.

TelemetryEndpoint detection, domain controller logs, internal network flow

Start at

Any occurrence. A host in a perimeter network has no legitimate reason to authenticate inward, so this is a rule rather than a threshold.

What else fires this

Poorly segmented legacy applications that genuinely do this, and backup agents. Both are findings in their own right, so the false positives here are worth the triage.

Source: FBI, 13 November 2026

Looking for your blind spots

T1518.001, Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery

Inventory queries that enumerate which hosts are missing an endpoint sensor. The agent is mapping where it will not be seen before it moves.

TelemetryEndpoint detection, script-block logging

Start at

Any query correlating host inventory against endpoint-agent presence from a non-administrative context.

What else fires this

Your own asset-management and compliance tooling, which does exactly this on a schedule. Allowlist it by identity and by host, and the remainder is high-fidelity.

Source: FBI, 13 November 2026

A feature turned into a megaphone

T1534, Internal Spearphishing

A notification or email feature that suddenly sends to hundreds of internal users — a legitimate function used as a mass-messaging tool.

TelemetryApplication logs, mail flow

Start at

Recipient count per send above your own 99th percentile for that feature, or any send above a fixed internal ceiling.

What else fires this

Genuine announcements, incident notifications and marketing sends. This is a cheap detection because the legitimate cases are scheduled and the illegitimate one is not.

Source: FBI, 13 November 2026

Web shell candidates

T1505.003, Server Software Component: Web ShellT1036.005, Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location

New server-executable files with short incremental names appearing in web application paths, and database logging reconfigured to write into a web-served directory.

TelemetryFile integrity monitoring, web server paths, database query logs

Start at

Any new executable file in a web root outside a deployment window. Any change to a database general-log path is worth alerting on by itself.

What else fires this

Deployments, and plugin or module installation in content-managed applications. Tie this to your release calendar — a new file in a web root during a deploy is noise, and the same file at 3am is not.

Sources: FBI, 13 November 2026; Zscaler ThreatLabz, 14 October 2026 (via FBI FLASH note 7; link reaches their index)

Queries

The logic, then one implementation of it

The code is for one vendor’s stack. The logic above each one is not, and it is the half you need if you are anywhere else — which is most people, and which is the half these packs usually omit while telling you to translate it.

Are the compromised vendor applications in my tenant, and what can they do?

Take the list of application identifiers. Join it against your directory's registered applications. For each match, return the display name, whether it was admin-consented, every permission granted, and the privilege level of each. Do this even where the integration is no longer in use — the grant outlives the usage.

Defender XDR advanced hunting

let VendorApps = dynamic([
    "506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae",
    "24205314-2b89-4e07-a2a4-579e898a5640",
    "0de14c77-b9b0-4137-9360-34878a929827"
]);
OAuthAppInfo
| where OAuthAppId in (VendorApps)
| mv-expand Permission = Permissions
| project AppName, OAuthAppId, ServicePrincipalId, AppStatus,
          PrivilegeLevel, IsAdminConsented,
          PermissionName = tostring(Permission.PermissionName),
          PermissionPrivilege = tostring(Permission.PrivilegeLevel)

Before you run it: Search by application identifier, never by display name — a display name is attacker-controllable and is not unique across tenants.

Adapted from: Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 21 October 2026

Did anything sign in as a service principal, or call the directory API, from reported infrastructure?

Union service-principal sign-ins with directory API activity, normalise the address column across the two schemas, filter to the reported addresses, and order by time. Then widen: the same query with the address filter removed, grouped by source network, is the one that finds infrastructure nobody has published yet.

Defender XDR advanced hunting

let IPs = dynamic([
    "144.172.64.60","144.172.64.99","144.172.64.128",
    "187.15.88.186","187.15.90.217","187.15.89.186"
]);
union kind=outer
    (EntraIdSpnSignInEvents | extend EventType = "SPN sign-in"),
    (GraphAPIAuditEvents   | extend EventType = "Graph API",
                             IPAddress = IpAddress)
| where Timestamp >= datetime(2026-10-01)
| where IPAddress in (IPs)
| order by Timestamp asc

Before you run it: The address column is `IPAddress` in one of these tables and `IpAddress` in the other. The casing difference is real and silently returns nothing if you do not normalise it, which is why the extend above exists.

Adapted from: Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 21 October 2026

Is one source address authenticating as several different service principals?

Group service-principal sign-ins by source address in hourly buckets. Count distinct service principals, successes and failures. Return buckets where one address used three or more distinct service principals and at least one attempt succeeded. This is behavioural: it keeps working after every published address has rotated.

Defender XDR advanced hunting

EntraIdSpnSignInEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| summarize SPNs = dcount(ServicePrincipalId),
            Failures = countif(ErrorCode != 0),
            Successes = countif(ErrorCode == 0)
    by IPAddress, bin(Timestamp, 1h)
| where SPNs >= 3 and Successes > 0

Before you run it: Exclude your own egress ranges first or this returns your CI estate. Validate the column names against your own tenant before scheduling it — this is a behavioural variant rather than a published query.

Adapted from: Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 21 October 2026

Did one identity read a lot of secrets across several vaults at once?

Filter vault audit events to successful secret reads. Bucket by 15 minutes and by identity. Count the reads and the distinct vaults. Return buckets with at least 20 reads across at least 3 vaults, and keep the source addresses for the follow-up.

Defender XDR advanced hunting

CloudKeyVaultEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where ActivityName == "SecretGet" and HttpStatusCode == 200
| summarize SecretGets = count(),
            VaultCount = dcount(AzureResourceId),
            IPs = make_set(IPAddress, 20)
    by bin(Timestamp, 15m), AccountObjectId, AccountTenantId
| where SecretGets >= 20 and VaultCount >= 3

Before you run it: Run it once with the thresholds removed to see your own deployment pipelines, then exclude those identities. Raising the threshold instead hides the attack as well as the pipeline.

Adapted from: Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 21 October 2026

Has anything on my network talked to reported infrastructure in the last 30 days?

Match outbound sessions against the address list, and summarise first seen, last seen and event count per source and destination pair. Vet before blocking: these are historical observations, and cloud addresses get reassigned.

Normalised network sessions (ASIM)

let ioc_ip_addr = dynamic([
    "199.19.95.66","199.19.95.67","199.19.95.68",
    "91.92.240.238","85.11.168.45","178.16.54.129",
    "31.77.229.35","85.11.167.52"
]);
_Im_NetworkSession(starttime=ago(30d), endtime=now())
| where DstIpAddr in (ioc_ip_addr)
| summarize FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated),
            LastSeen  = max(TimeGenerated),
            EventCount = count()
    by SrcIpAddr, DstIpAddr, DstDomain, Dvc

Before you run it: The address list here is corrected — see the corrections below. The published sample query for this campaign contains 178.15.54.129, which is not the address in the indicator table it was written from.

Adapted from: Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 6 November 2026; FBI, 13 November 2026

Indicators

The atoms, dated

Last on the page on purpose. Every row carries its campaign, its date, the report it came from, and where we think it is worth starting.

IndicatorTypeCampaignContextSourceUse
199.19.95[.]66199.19.95[.]67199.19.95[.]68IP addressStorm-3358, financial sectorRemote-access tool command and control6 November 2026FBI, Microsoft Threat IntelligenceBlock
91.92.240[.]23885.11.168[.]45178.16.54[.]12931.77.229[.]35IP addressStorm-3358, financial sectorFramework servers6 November 2026FBI, Microsoft Threat IntelligenceBlock
85.11.167[.]52IP addressStorm-3358, financial sectorCommand and control6 November 2026FBI, Microsoft Threat IntelligenceBlock
144.172.64[.]60144.172.64[.]99144.172.64[.]128IP addressStorm-0940, vendor supply chainPassword spraying, then sign-ins and directory API activity inside customer environmentsReported 21 October 2026FBI, Microsoft Threat IntelligenceBlock
187.15.88[.]186187.15.90[.]217187.15.89[.]186IP addressStorm-0940, vendor supply chainDirectory API access via compromised applications; transient addressesRelevant 15–16 October 2026 onlyFBI, Microsoft Threat IntelligenceHunt
38.244.50[.]120IP addressSouth Korean financial institutionsFramework host with an open directoryReported 7 October 2026FBI, CrowdStrike, CensysHunt
101.53.80[.]20205.214.59[.]31124.155.252[.]63154.201.79[.]24623.248.249[.]9023.158.220[.]98103.248.148[.]84203.160.133[.]172209.209.85[.]38IP addressSouth Korean financial institutionsOperator proxiesReported 7 October 2026FBI, CrowdStrikeHunt
xcai[.]proDomainSouth Korean financial institutionsModel API reseller used by the operatorReported 7 October 2026FBI, CrowdStrikeHunt
506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644aeApplication IDStorm-0940, vendor supply chainVendor cloud backup applicationReported 21 October 2026FBI, Microsoft Threat IntelligenceHunt
24205314-2b89-4e07-a2a4-579e898a5640Application IDStorm-0940, vendor supply chainVendor collaboration integrationReported 21 October 2026FBI, Microsoft Threat IntelligenceHunt
0de14c77-b9b0-4137-9360-34878a929827Application IDStorm-0940, vendor supply chainVendor directory API integrationReported 21 October 2026FBI, Microsoft Threat IntelligenceHunt
azure-toolkit/1.0User agentStorm-0940, vendor supply chainSign-ins and directory API calls. The most distinctive of the set.Reported 21 October 2026Microsoft Threat IntelligenceHunt
Python-urllib/3.12python-requests/2.31.0python-requests/2.34.2curl/7.88.1User agentStorm-0940, vendor supply chainSign-ins, directory API and web probing. Common clients — these mean nothing on their own.Reported 21 October 2026Microsoft Threat IntelligenceContext
api.anthropic.comapi.deepseek.comopen.bigmodel.cnapi.x.aiDomainMultipleModel API endpoints. Legitimate for a developer workstation; worth a question from a production database server.Reported 13 November 2026FBI, Zscaler ThreatLabzContext
*.aspx, *.jsp in unexpected web application pathsArtefactMultipleWeb shellsReported 13 November 2026FBI, Zscaler ThreatLabzHunt
artex-probe-NNNNN (five digits, incrementing)ArtefactMultipleAccess-probe files left in web roots, storage buckets and file shares. High fidelity — the name is the tool's own.Reported 30 October 2026Google Threat Intelligence Group and MandiantHunt
Accounts containing ArtexProbeArtefactMultiplePersistence accounts in directories and application user tables, often with incrementing numbers and a plaintext password stored beside them.Reported 30 October 2026Google Threat Intelligence Group and MandiantHunt
cl1217.jspf1219a.jspz1219.jspArtefactMultipleWeb shell naming pattern rather than fixed names: short alphanumeric plus date-like digits, in a web-served path. Hunt the shape, not these three strings.Reported 30 October 2026Google Threat Intelligence Group and MandiantHunt
SET GLOBAL general_log_file -> a web-served pathArtefactMultipleDatabase query logging repointed into a web directory so the log itself becomes a web shell. Any change to this setting is worth an alert on its own.Reported 30 October 2026Google Threat Intelligence Group and MandiantHunt
webhook[.]siteDomainMultipleLegitimate request-capture service used for command output; one run rotated through 491 URLs on it. Alert on server egress, not on the domain alone.Reported 30 October 2026Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant, FBIHunt
Self-hosted model gateway or reseller software on your own hostsArtefactMultipleThe FBI asks for evidence of self-hosted model gateways and unfamiliar model resellers in egress logs as a reportable artefact.Reported 13 November 2026FBIHunt

Block — after vetting it against your own telemetry, per step 2 above; several of these are proxies or cloud hosts that get reassigned. Hunt — search for it, do not block it. Context — meaningless on its own, and worth something only beside one of the behaviours above.

Addresses re-armed for ingestion. Built from the same table above, so the two cannot disagree. Reviewed 18 November 2026.

Sources: FBI, 13 November 2026; Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 21 October 2026; Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 6 November 2026; Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant, 30 October 2026; CrowdStrike, 7 October 2026 (via FBI FLASH note 6; link reaches their index); Zscaler ThreatLabz, 14 October 2026 (via FBI FLASH note 7; link reaches their index); Censys, 5 November 2026 (via FBI FLASH note 4; link reaches their index)

Corrections

What we are carrying

Three things we found wrong in the published material, and one trap in the platform. Each was found by reading a query against the table it was written from, and each is checkable from the source beside it.

CorrectionChecked 18 November 2026

An address in a published sample query does not match its own indicator table

The sample network-session query for the financial-sector campaign contains 178.15.54.129. The indicator table in the same post, and the FBI's table, both give 178.16.54[.]129 — the third octet differs. Use 178.16.54[.]129. Anyone who pasted the query without reading the table has been hunting an address that was never reported.

Checked against: Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 6 November 2026; FBI, 13 November 2026

CorrectionChecked 18 November 2026

A vendor advisory says four application identifiers and lists three

The supply-chain post instructs defenders to inventory all four application identifiers listed in the profile; three appear in the published content. We publish the three that exist. If you are working from this list, treat it as incomplete and search by publisher rather than by identifier alone.

Checked against: Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 21 October 2026

CorrectionChecked 18 November 2026

The address column changes capitalisation between two tables in the same query

Service-principal sign-in events expose the source address as IPAddress; directory API audit events expose it as IpAddress. A union across the two filtered on either spelling silently returns half the data and no error. The query above normalises it.

Checked against: Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 21 October 2026

The other half: what to change

A 72-hour and 30-day matrix, and seven control areas with a test for each one that can come back negative.

Open the controls guide

Hunting tells you whether it already happened. Testing tells you whether it can. How our engine works, or point it at your external surface.